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Contagion dynamics of extremist
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Abstract. Recent terrorist attacks carried out on behalf of ISIS on American and
European soil by lone wolf attackers or sleeper cells remind us of the importance
of understanding the dynamics of radicalization mediated by social media com-
munication channels. In this paper, we shed light on the social media activity of
a group of twenty-five thousand users whose association with ISIS online radical
propaganda has been manually verified. By using a computational tool known as
dynamic activity-connectivity maps, based on network and temporal activity pat-
terns, we investigate the dynamics of social influence within ISIS supporters. We
finally quantify the effectiveness of ISIS propaganda by determining the adoption
of extremist content in the general population and draw a parallel between radical
propaganda and epidemics spreading, highlighting that information broadcasters
and influential ISIS supporters generate highly-infectious cascades of information
contagion. Our findings will help generate effective countermeasures to combat the
group and other forms of online extremism.
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1. Introduction
Researchers in the computational social science community have recently demonstrated
the importance of studying online social networks to understand our society [42]. New
powerful technologies are usually harbinger of abuse, and online platforms are no ex-
ception: social media have been shown to be systematically abused for nefarious pur-
poses [23]. As online social environments yield plenty of incentives and opportunities
for unprecedented, even “creative” forms of misuse, single individuals as well as organi-
zations and governments have systematically interfered with these platforms, oftentimes
driven by some hidden agenda, in a variety of reported cases:
• During crises, social media have been effectively used for emergency response;
but fear-mongering actions have also triggered mass hysteria and panic [32,23].
• Political conversation has been manipulated by means of orchestrated astroturf
campaigns [50,45] even during election times [34,14].
• Anti-vaccination movements [58,60], as well as conspiracy (and other anti-
science) theorists [13,21], took social media by the storm and became responsible
for a major health crisis in the United States [53].
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• Social media bots (non-human automated accounts) have been used to coordinate
attacks to successfully manipulate the stock market, causing losses in the billions
of dollars [35,23,24,62].
• Some governments and non-state actors have been active on social media to
spread their propaganda. In some cases, they have allegedly “polluted” these plat-
forms with content to sway public opinion [23,22,37], or to hinder the ability of
social collectives to communicate, coordinate, and mobilize [57].
Especially related to the last point, researchers have been recently devoting more
attention to issues related to online propaganda campaigns [55,51,6]. Increasing evidence
provided by numerous independent studies suggests that social media played a pivotal
role in the rise in popularity of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (viz. ISIS) [28,56,
66,25,8]. Determining whether ISIS benefitted from using social media for propaganda
and recruitment was central for many research endeavors [11,9,44].
Analyses by Berger and Morgan suggested that a restricted number of highly-active
accounts (500-1000 users) is responsible for most of ISIS’ visibility on Twitter [9]. How-
ever, Berger’s subsequent work suggested that ISIS’ reach (at least among English speak-
ers) has stalled for months as of the beginning of 2016, due to more aggressive account
suspension policies enacted by Twitter [10]. Other researchers tried to unveil the roots
of support for ISIS, suggesting that ISIS backers discussed Arab Spring uprisings on
Twitter significantly more than users who stood against ISIS [44].
These early investigations all share one common methodological limitation, namely
that to collect social media data they start from keywords known to be associated to
ISIS [9,10,44]. This strategy has been widely adopted in a previous research aimed at
characterizing social movements [30,18,63]. However, we argue that it is not sufficient
to focus on keyword-based online chatter to pinpoint to relevant actors of radical conver-
sation.
In fact, our recent results [8] suggest that radical propaganda revolves around four
independent types of messanging: (i) theological and religious topics; (ii) violence; (iii)
sectarian discussion; and, (iv) influential actors and events. Here is a series of examples
of possible biases introduced by the keyword-centric approach:
• Some studies [44] focused on religion-based keyword lists, but most terms typi-
cally associated to religion are not necessarily used in the context of extremism.
• Other studies [9,10] focused on influential actors or events; this can introduce
biases due to the focus on popular actors rather than the overall conversation.
• Further noise can be introduced by tweets that simply link to news articles re-
porting on events; although these tweets may contain keywords in the predefined
watchlist, they clearly do not represent extremist propaganda efforts.
• Finally, focusing on pre-determined keywords could cause incomplete data col-
lection by missing topics of discussion that can emerge dynamically and do not
adopt any of the predefined key terms.
In this work, we will leverage an alternative data collection and curation approach:
we will start from a large set of Twitter users that are known to be associated to or
symphatizers of ISIS. We will then collect their activity over a large time span of over
one year to obtain a complete characterization of their extremist propaganda efforts.
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1.1. Contributions of this work
This study aims to address the two following research questions:
RQ1: Can we define a solid methodological framework and suggest good practices
for data collection, validation, and analysis to study online radicalization?.
Setting such best practices will hopefully steer the information sciences and com-
putational social sciences research communities in the direction of producing more rig-
orous and reproducible work. One contribution of our work is to address this issue by
focusing on manually-verified set of ISIS supporter accounts.
After describing how we collected and curated the dataset object of this study, we
move forward to investigate the dynamics of online propaganda adopted by ISIS. Using
computational social science tools to gauge online extremism, we aim to answer the
following second research question:
RQ2: What types of network and temporal patterns of activity reflect the dynamics
of social influence within ISIS supporters? And, can we quantify the adoption of
extremist content in the general population?.
Our findings will help generate effective countermeasures to combat the group and
other forms of online extremism.
2. Data Collection and Curation
Due to the the limits of keyword-based data collection approaches we highlighted above,
in this work we exclusively rely on data and labels obtained by using a procedure of man-
ual data curation and expert verification. We obtained a list of Twitter accounts whose
activity was labeled as supportive of the Islamic State by the online crowd-sourcing ini-
tiative called Lucky Troll Club. The goal of this initiative was to leverage annotators with
expertise in Arabic languages to identify accounts affiliated to ISIS and report them to
Twitter to request their suspension. Twitter’s anti-abuse team manually verifies all sus-
pension requests, and grants some based on evidence of violation of Twitter’s Terms of
Service policy against the usage of the platform for extremist purposes.
We verified that 25,538 accounts present in the Lucky Troll Club list have been sus-
pended by Twitter in the period between March 17, 2015 and June 9, 2015. In this study,
we focus only on this subset of twenty-five thousand accounts: we consider their activity
to be unequivocally linked to the Islamic State, as determined by the two-step manual
verification process described above. For each account, we have at our disposal informa-
tion about the suspension date, as well as the number of followers of that user as of the
suspension date. The anonymized data focus of this study can be made available to the
interested researchers upon request. For contact information and further details about the
dataset please visit: http://www.emilio.ferrara.name/datasets/
2.1. Twitter data collection
The next step of our study consisted in collecting data related to the activity of the 25,538
ISIS supporters on Twitter. To this purpose, we leveraged the Observatory on Social
Media (OSoMe) data source set up by our collaborators at Indiana University [20], which
May 2017
continuously collects the Twitter data stream from the gardenhose API (roughly a 10%
random sample of the full Twitter data stream). Using this large data stream avoids known
issues derived by using the public Twitter stream API which serves only less than 1% of
the overall tweets [47].
We obtained all tweets present in the OSoMe database that have been posted by any
of the twenty-five thousand ISIS accounts prior to their suspension. We also included all
retweets these tweets generated, and all tweets containing mentions to such set of ISIS
supporters. The resulting dataset that we will study consists of 3,395,901 tweets. Almost
1.2 million of these tweets was generated by the ISIS accounts during the period between
January 2014 and June 2015. We found that a total of 54,358 distinct other users has
retweeted at least once one of the twenty-five thousand ISIS supporters. This amounts
for the remainder of about 2.2 million tweets in our dataset.
Summarizing, we identified two best practices to answer RQ1:
• Favor starting from a manually-verified list of users involved in online propa-
ganda, radicalization efforts, or recruitment, rather focusing on keyword-based
searches. When such manually validated lists are not available, human annota-
tions can be generated by means of services such as Amazon Mechanical Turk.
• Use large social media data streams, when available, rather than small samples
that can be biased. Services like the Indiana University’s OSoMe database [20]
can provide data sources especially valuable for Twitter-based social media stud-
ies. Alternatively, the Twitter Search API can yield comprehensive data around
specific users or topics, provided that the search is limited to short time frames.
2.2. Limitations and strategic choices of this study
The largest majority of the tweets in our dataset, over 92%, is in Arabic. This introduces
a number of important challenges, from both technical and methodological perspectives.
From a technical standpoint, analyzing Arabic content would require sophisticated natu-
ral language processing (NLP) techniques as well as accurate sentiment analysis tools ca-
pable of extracting emotional information. NLP toolkits with support for Arabic content
are only recently starting to be developed [31], while Arabic-based sentiment analysis is
still in its early developmental stage [38].
From a methodological point of view, the analysis of Arabic-language material
would require interpreters with sufficient domain knowledge in extremism-related issues
to yield useful and unbiased insights from the data. Access to such experts is not always
available, and thus the need to develop alternative strategies of enquiry emerges.
For these reasons, in the rest of the paper our analysis will rely exclusively upon
language-agnostic techniques: in particular, we will focus on statistical properties of in-
formation diffusion networks, which were proven very useful in our prior studies on
criminal networks [5], as well as temporal patterns of information diffusion, which we
already exploited to study the interplay between ISIS’ activity online and offline [8].
Due to the simplifications introduced by our strategy of enquiry, we call for caution
in the interpretation of our results. However, we believe that our approach will help
identify important areas of research that warrant further development (such as Arabic-
based NLP and sentiment analysis toolkits), as well as yield valuable insight about ISIS
social media operations and other forms of online extremist propaganda.
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Figure 1. Timeline of suspensions per day of the 25,538 ISIS-supporting accounts. The main figure shows the
daily suspension counts, while the inset figure shows the cumulative count.
3. Results
We next report our investigation to address RQ2. We study the activity of ISIS supporters
and sympathizers on Twitter by means of the data collected as described above.
3.1. Activity and Support of ISIS Accounts
The first form of validation that we performed pertains the mechanisms of suspension
of ISIS accounts on Twitter. As we mentioned before, we identified a set of twenty-
five thousand accounts related to ISIS that have been suspended: Fig. 1 shows the time-
line of suspensions of the accounts under investigation. The suspension period occurred
throughout almost three months, with the first suspensions occurring on March 17, 2015
and the last occurring on June 9, 2015. After this date, none among the twenty-five thou-
sand accounts in our list is anymore active on Twitter. Account suspensions appear to
occur in batches, some more substantial than others, with a significant spike of suspen-
sions (over ten thousands) occurred on April 2, 2015. Our findings are consistent with
The Guardian’s report that, between April 2015 and February 2016, Twitter’s anti-abuse
task force suspended more than 125,000 accounts linked to ISIS [67].
Recent literature reported contrasting evidence about the activity and popularity of
ISIS supporters on Twitter [9,10]. As for today, it is unclear whether ISIS accounts ob-
tained a significant support on Twitter, and to what extent they were active. Berger and
collaborators first found that ISIS presence was very pervasive on Twitter during 2014-
2015 [9], and later suggested that only a core of 500-2000 ISIS users was active after that
period [10]. To shed light on this question, we calculated the distribution of the number
of followers and followees (friends) of ISIS accounts at the time of their suspension,
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Figure 2. Probability distributions of the number of tweets posted by ISIS supporters, generated retweets, and
the number of followers and followees at the time of their suspension.
along with the number of tweets and retweets they generated. For each of these four vari-
ables, we calculated their probability distribution Pr(x). These probability distributions
display the probabilities of values taken by the four variables (i.e., tweets, retweets, fol-
lowers, followees) in our dataset: they can be thought as normalized frequency distribu-
tions, where all occurrences of outcomes for each distribution sum to 1. The results are
shown in Fig. 2.
Let us discuss support and activity separately. Concerning ISIS support on Twitter,
we notice that the distribution of followers of ISIS accounts exhibits the long tail typical
of Twitter [40] and other social networks (cf. yellow dash-dotted line in Fig. 2). This
skewed distribution has mean µ = 516 (σ = 1,727), median Q2 = 130, and lower and
upper quartiles Q1 = 37 and Q3 = 401. This means that the majority of accounts has
a limited number of followers (for example, one quarter of the users has less than 37
followers), yet a significant number of ISIS supporters managed to obtain a large num-
ber of followers before getting suspended (in fact, the upper quartile of users has more
than 400 followers). The presence of this broad distribution of followership suggests that
influence and radicalization operations of Islamic State supporters on Twitter were suc-
cessful for at least several thousand of their accounts. This is in line with Berger’s early
results discussed above [9]. Another interesting insight is yielded by the distribution of
followees (cf. green dotted line in Fig. 2): differently from the distribution of followers,
this distribution shows an unexpected upward trend in the regime between 100 and 1,000
followees. This characteristic behavior has been associated to forms of social network
manipulation, for example attempts to create rings or cliques in which multiple accounts
under the control of a same entity all follow each other to reciprocally increase their
visibility and followership [50]. We thus suggest that ISIS accounts enacted strategies to
artificially enhance their visibility by strengthening one another social networks.
A significant portion of ISIS accounts was very active on Twitter: both distributions
of tweets (cf. solid blue line) and retweets (cf. red dashed line) shown in Fig. 2 exhibit
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Figure 3. Timeline of total number of tweets generated by ISIS supporters. The main figure shows the number
of tweets per week; the inset figure shows the cumulative count.
the typical power-law shape common to social networks with heterogeneous activity pat-
terns. This implies that a significant fraction of users posted and retweeted large amounts
of tweets. For example, at least 1% of the ISIS users posted at least 30 tweets during the
observation period; similar figures hold for retweeting. More importantly, there appears
to be a strong core constituted by a few dozen accounts who posted and retweeted hun-
dreds of tweets in the same period. This set of very active ISIS supporters we found is
compatible with what reported by Berger’s first study [9]. Furthermore, there seems to
be a handful of accounts with thousands of tweets and retweets, suggesting the likely
presence of some social media bot used to enhance the volume of content generated by
ISIS and its spreding on Twitter [24].
To investigate ISIS accounts’ activity further, we extrapolated the time series of the
total volume of tweets and retweets posted every week by the ISIS users under investi-
gation: the result is shown in Fig. 3. It’s worth noting that our observation window spans
1.5 years and starts on January 2014 when the firsts among the twenty-five thousand ISIS
supporters became active on Twitter: Although the activity volume slowly builds up over
time, it is only in early March 2015 (15 months into our observation period) that the
volume of tweets per week drastically spikes.
In the early regime between January 2014 and March 2015 the volume of tweets
associated to ISIS accounts spans 1,000 to 10,000 per week. This increases nearly tenfold
after March 2015, with a spike of over 100,000 tweets per week, and an average of over
60,000 tweets per week in the period between March and May 2015. This period concurs
with the period of strongest Twitter suspensions shown in Fig. 1, suggesting a timely
reaction of Twitter to fight the activity of ISIS users on the platform. Indeed, the volume
of tweets per week produced by these accounts drops in early June, and goes to zero, as
expected, in the late period of observation when fewer and fewer of the ISIS accounts
under investigation are left unchecked on Twitter. Cumulatively, the ISIS users under
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Figure 4. The dynamic activity-connectivity map shows the Joint Probability Density Function pd f (x,y) of
the connectivity growth x and the activity rate y as defined in Equation 1.
investigation produced almost 1.2 million tweets during the observation period (cf. inset
of Fig. 3).
Our findings pinpoint to the power of the crowd-sourcing volunteer initiative that
set to bring up to Twitter’s attention these accounts. However, there is no evidence to
quantify how many (if any) of the ISIS supporters not recorded by the Lucky Troll Club
operation were independently suspended by Twitter anti-abuse team.
3.2. Dynamic Activity-Connectivity Maps
We further address RQ1 by offering a powerful tool to information scientists and com-
putational social scientists: the dynamic activity-connectivity (DAC) maps. DAC maps
allow to study influence and authority dynamics of online extremism in social networks
with temporal activity patterns.
Fig. 4 shows an example of dynamic activity-connectivity map. We developed DAC
maps as dynamic variants of the map proposed by Gonzalez-Bailon and collaborators—
see Figure 4 in Broadcasters and Hidden Influentials in Online Protest Diffusion [29].
The key intuition behind this tool is to allow investigate what effect the progression of
activity levels of an user has of their connectivity evolution (and viceversa).
In a DAC map, for a given user u, xu and yu are defined as
xu =
1+δ fu
1+δFu
and yu =
1+mu
1+Mu
. (1)
We use the notation fu and Fu to identify the number of followers and friends, re-
spectively, of a user u. The variation of followers and friends of user u over a period of
time t are thus defined as δ fu = f
max
u − f minu
t and δFu =
Fmaxu −Fminu
t ; the length of time t is
defined as the number of days of u’s activity, measured from registration to suspension
(this varies from user to user). Finally, mu is the number of mentions user u received
by others, and Mu is the number of mentions user u made to others, during u’s activity
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period. All values are added to the unit to avoid zero-divisions and allow for logarithmic
scaling (i.e., in those cases where the variation is zero). The third dimension, the“heat”
(the color intensity) in the map, represents the joint probability density pd f (x,y) for
users with given values of x and y. The plot also introduce a bin normalization to account
for the logarithmic binning.
The two dimensions defined over the dynamic activity-connectivity map are inter-
preted as follows: the x-axis represents the growth of connectivity formation, and the
y-axis conveys the rate of messaging activity. In general, we would expect that in a dy-
namic activity-connectivity map, the bulk of the joint probability density mass would be
observed in the neighborhood of (1,1), that hosts the majority of accounts for which the
variation of the two dimensions is comparable.
DAC maps are ideal tools to addres our second research question (RQ2): they cap-
ture at the same time network and temporal patterns of activity, and they can help un-
derstand how connectivity variations affects social influence (and viceversa), which are
dynamics at the core of our investigation.
Let us discuss the two dimensions of Figure 4, namely connectivity growth and ac-
tivity rate, separately. The connectivity growth is captured by the x axis and, in our case,
ranges roughly between 10−2 and 103. Users for which x > 1 (i.e., 100) are those with
a followership that grows much faster than the rate at which these users are following
others. In other words, they are acquiring social network popularity (followers) at a fast-
paced rate. Note that, if a user is acquiring many followers quickly, but s/he is also follow-
ing many users at a similar rate, the value of x will be near 1. This is a good property of
our measure because it is common strategy on social media platforms, especially among
bots [24,14], to indiscriminately follow others in order to seek for reciprocal follower-
ships. Our dynamic activity-connectivity map will discriminate users with fast-growing
followerships, who will appear in the right-hand side of the map, from those who adopt
that type of reciprocity-seeking strategy. The former group can be associated with highly
popular users with a fast-paced followership growth. According to Gonzalez-Bailon and
collaborators [29] this category is composed by two groups: influential users and infor-
mation broadcasters, depending on their activity rates. Values of x< 1 indicate users who
follow others at a rate higher than that they are being followed; the fall in the left-hand
side of the map. According to Gonzalez-Bailon and collaborators, these are mostly the
common users, although the so-called hidden influentials also sit in this low-connectivity
regime.
As for what concerns the y axis, it measures the activity rate, i.e., the rate at which a
user receives mentions versus how frequently s/he mentions others. Users with values of
y> 1 are those who receive systematically more mentions with respect to how frequently
they mention others. This group of users can be referred to as influentials, i.e., those who
are referred to significantly more frequently than others in the conversation; they fall in
the upper region of the map, and according to Gonzalez-Bailon et al., depending on their
connectivity growth can be divide in influential (x > 1) and hidden influential (x < 1)
users. Conversely, users with values of y < 1 are those who generate increasingly more
mentions over time, either because they reply to many tweets, or because they address
directly other users. This group generally represents the common-user behavior (x < 1),
although information broadcasters (x > 1) also exhibit the same low-activity rate. These
users fall in the lower region of the map.
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Figure 5. Distributions of (i) number of posted tweets, (ii) number of obtained retweets, and (iii) number of
followers, for common users, broadcasters, influencial, and hidden influencial users, respectively.
Now that a reading of dynamic activity-connectivity maps has been provided, we
can proceed with interpreting Fig. 4: the bottom-left quadrant reports the most common
users, those with both activity and connectivity growth lesser than 1. Conversely, the
upper-right quadrant reports users with the higher connectivity growth and activity rates.
These are influential ISIS supporters who are very active in the discussion. We note
how the connectivity growth dimension spans three orders of magnitude in the positive
domain, while the activity rate dimension only spans two orders of magnitude. This
means that some users’ followerships grows tens of times faster than the rate at which
they follow others; conversely, the rate of receiving mentions is only up to tens of times
higher than that of mentioning of others. In the next section, we will devote special
attention to these four different classes of users to determine what types of differences
emerge in the ISIS social network.
3.3. Dynamical Classes of ISIS Supporter Behaviors
Prior research illuminated on the dynamical aspects of activity and connectivity in so-
cial media [43,29]. Next, we focus on the four classes of user behaviors highlighted by
the dynamic activity-connectivity map. We first select, out of the twenty-five thousand
ISIS supporters in our dataset, only the subset of those who have mentioned and have
been mentioned at least once during the observation period. This will allow to focus on
active accounts and correctly capture their activity rate. This filter reduces the number
of users under investigation to N = 13,024 ISIS supporters, nearly half of the entire
ISIS population initially collected. We further divide these users in the four dynamical
classes defined above. The classification is obtained by simply adopting the rules defin-
ing the four quadrants of Fig. 4, which yields N = 3,475 common users (x < 1,y < 1),
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Figure 6. Timeline of the number of individuals per day who adopted ISIS contents.
N = 3,339 information broadcasters (x> 1,y< 1), N = 3,218 influentials (x> 1,y> 1)),
and N = 2,992 hidden influential users (x < 1,y > 1).
For each of these users, we generated the distribution of (i) the total number of tweets
they posted, (ii) the cumulative number of times they have been retweeted, and (iii) the
maximum number of followers they gathered. Fig. 5 shows the boxplots corresponding
to the four dynamical classes. Significant differences emerge: common users produce an
amount of tweets very similar to that of broadcasters, but they accrue nearly one order of
magnitude less retweets than the latter. Information broadcasters also appear to generate
the largest followerships, on par with influential users; influentials, however, post signif-
icantly less tweets, while accumulating similar amounts of retweets than broadcasters,
suggesting that our map successfully captures a notion of social influence intended as a
proxy for attention generated to one’s posts. The class of hidden influentials shows com-
parable activity to influential users, but significantly less influence, accruing about one
order of magnitude less tweets and significantly smaller followerships than influentials.
Our analysis suggests that different classes of ISIS supporters’ behaviors emerge. In
the future, we will study what are the characteristics of different classes that produce the
most effective propaganda and make the most influential users, analyzing content and
language, political and religious beliefs, motives and attitudes of the ISIS social network.
3.4. Adoption of ISIS Propaganda
So far, our analysis focused on characterizing some dimensions of the behavior of ISIS
supporters on Twitter. Next, we investigate whether the content they generated has been
adopted by other users who have become exposed to it. This will help address the last
part of our second research question (RQ2), namely whether we can quantify the adop-
tion of extremist content in the general population. Our notion of adoption is very simple:
when a user who does not appear set of the twenty-five thousand ISIS accounts retweets
for the first time any tweet generated by one such ISIS supporter, we count this as a
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content adoption. Although some recent work suggested that retweeting radical propa-
ganda can be considered as an early sign of radicalization [9,44], we call for caution
about interpreting the results in such a way: this definition greatly simplifies the notion
and complexity of such types of online adoption processes [15,16,39,26,27]. However,
we do believe that investigating the spread of radical content in the user population has a
value to determine the extent and effectiveness of ISIS propaganda operations.
Fig. 6 shows the time series of the number of ISIS content adoptions per day during
the first half of 2015. Prior to that, no significant amount of adoptions could be observed,
partly due to the low activity rate of the accounts under investigation. In the three months
between March and June 2015, we notice a significant uptake in the number of adoptions,
peaking at nearly one thousand adoptions per day. In that period, at least 10,000 tweets
per day (70,000-100,000 tweets/week) were generated by ISIS accounts (cf. Fig 3). This
suggests that a very significant fraction of tweets, about 5-10%, was actually retweeted
on average at least once by other users. During this period, a total of 54,358 distinct other
users has retweeted at least once one of the twenty-five thousand ISIS supporters.
If we simplify propaganda diffusion as an infectious disease, we can draw a parallel
with epidemics. The basic reproduction number R0 of an infection is the number of cases
generated on average by an infected individual over the course of its infectious period, in
an otherwise uninfected population. Given that 25,538 ISIS supporters generated 54,358
distinct infected users, we can derive an R0 = 2.13 for the ISIS propaganda “infection”. In
other words, an ISIS supporter before being suspended on average “infected” 2.13 other
users. For comparison, health epidemics like Ebola, [7,41] SARS, [65] HIV/AIDS, [33,
48] and certain strains of influenza [46] all have similar values of 2 < R0 < 3.
3.5. Contagion dynamics of ISIS Propaganda
We conclude our analysis by studying the cascades of content adoptions generated by
the four classes of users defined above. This investigation is twofold: first, we would like
to determine whether the mechanisms of receiving retweets (what we defined as content
adoption) and being mentioned by out-of-sample users exposed to extremist content fol-
low the same or different dynamics. Second, we will compute the distributions of scores
for the basic reproduction number R0 relative to both receiving retweets and mentions for
the four classes of users. The goal is to reveal whether any significant difference emerge
between groups of users in their content spreading efficacy, and ultimately to understand
which groups of users generated the most effective information contagions.
Fig. 7 shows the distributions of retweets (top) and mentions (bottom) received by
the users in the four classes defined by means of the dynamic activity-connectivity map.
Although overall all distributions are broad, as expected given the heterogeneous nature
of information diffusion, the dynamics of obtaining retweets and mentions are signifi-
cantly different for the four groups: in particular, for what concerns receiving mentions,
no appreciable difference emerges among the four classes of users, which suggests that
ISIS supporters are being mentioned in a similar fashion regardless of the class they be-
long to. However, receiving retweets shows a different mechanism: influential and broad-
caster users receive generate significantly larger retweet cascades much more frequently
than common users and hidden influentials.
One question that thus rises concerns whether the actual contagion effectiveness
varies between classes of users. In other words, what are the classes of users that are
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Figure 7. Probability distributions of retweets (top) and mentions (bottom) obtained by ISIS users as divided
in the four dynamical classes, namely common users, broadcasters, influential and hidden influential users.
Each group reports the size of the population under investigation (different in the two scenarios).
generating the most effective propaganda campaigns, in terms of adoption (i.e., retweets)
and engagement (i.e., mentions)? To this purpose, for each ISIS user who obtained at
least one retweet (resp., mention), we calculated the fraction RTT of received retweets RT
(resp., mentions) over the total number of his/her tweets T that have been retweeted at
least once (resp., mentioned) by an out-of-sample user (i.e., a user not labeled as ISIS by
our list). This measures the rate of diffusion of tweets in the otherwise uninfected popu-
lation. We note that this is a simplification of the more traditional notion of information
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Figure 8. Frequency of basic reproduction scores R0 relative to obtained retweets (top) and mentions (bottom)
calculated for the four dynamical classes of ISIS users.
contagion where we would consider all the tweets generated and more complex diffusion
mechanisms accounting e.g., for exposures, due to the limitation of the platform under
study (namely, we do not have any information about information exposure on Twitter).
With some abuse of notation, we thus consider the fraction RTT to convey the meaning of
the basic reproduction number R0 typical of epidemiology.
Finally, ISIS accounts are divided in their four classes, according to the usual clas-
sification, and the frequency of the basic reproduction scores R0 is shown in Fig. 8, sep-
arately for the two dynamics of receiving retweets (top) and mentions (bottom). While
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no significant difference emerges, in either scenario, among the four different classes
of users for the lowest scores (i.e., 2 < R0 < 2.5 for retweets, and 1 < R0 < 1.2 for
mentions), strong class differences emerge for users whose content are more contagious
(R0 > 2.5 for retweets, and R0 > 1.2 for mentions): concerning retweets, influential users,
followed by information broadcasters, are receiving systematically more attention than
users in other classes; the class differences for mentions are less pronounced.
4. Related work
One of the first computational frameworks, proposed by Bermingham et al. [12] in 2009,
combined social network analysis with sentiment detection tools to study the agenda of a
radical YouTube group: the authors examined the topics discussed within the group and
their polarity, to model individuals’ behavior and spot signs of extremism and intoler-
ance, seemingly more prominent among female users. The detection of extremist content
(on the Web) was also the focus of a 2010 work by Qi et al. [49]. The authors applied
hierarchical clustering to extremist Web pages to divide them into different pre-imposed
categories (religious, anti immigration, etc.).
Scanlon and Gerber proposed the first method to detect cyber-recruitment efforts
in 2014 [54]. They exploited data retrieved from the Dark Web Portal Project [17], a
repository of posts compiled from 28 different online fora on extremist religious dis-
cussions (e.g., Jihadist) translated from Arabic to English. After annotating a sample of
posts as recruitment efforts or not, the authors use Bayesian criteria and a set of textual
features to classify the rest of the corpus, obtaining good accuracy, and highlighted the
most predictive terms.
Along the same trend, Agarwal and Sureka proposed different machine learning
strategies [1,59,3,4] aimed at detecting radicalization efforts, cyber recruitment, hate pro-
motion, and extremist support in a variety of online platforms, including YouTube, Twit-
ter and Tumblr. Their frameworks leverage features of contents and metadata, and com-
binations of crawling and unsupervised clustering methods, to study the online activity
of Jihadist groups on the platforms mentioned above.
A few studies explored unconventional data sources: one interesting example is the
work by Vergani and Bliuc [64] that uses sentiment analysis (Linguistic Inquiry and
Word Count [61]) to investigate how language evolved across the first 11 Issues of Dabiq,
the flagship ISIS propaganda magazine. Their analysis offers some insights about ISIS
radicalization motives, emotions and concerns. For example, the authors found that ISIS
has become increasingly concerned with females, reflecting their need to attract women
to create their utopia society, not revolving around warriors but around families. ISIS also
seems to have increased the use of internet jargon, possibly to connect with the identities
of young individuals online.
Concluding, two very recent articles [52,36] explore the activity of ISIS on social
media. The former [52] focuses on Twitter and aims at detecting users who exhibit signals
of behavioral change in line with radicalization: the authors suggest that out of 154K
users only about 700 show significant signs of possible radicalization, and that may be
due to social homophily rather than the mere exposure to propaganda content. The latter
study [36] explores a set of 196 pro-ISIS aggregates operating on VKontakte (the most
popular Russian online social network) and involving about 100K users, to study the
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dynamics of survival of such groups online: the authors suggest that the development
of large and potentially influential pro-ISIS groups can be hindered by targeting and
shutting down smaller ones. For additional pointers we refer the interested reader to two
recent literature reviews on this topic [19,2].
5. Conclusions
Since the appearance of the Islamic State (viz. ISIS), a consensus has emerged on the
relationship between extremism and social media, namely that ISIS’ success as a terror-
ist organization is due at least in part to its savvy use of social media. It is widely be-
lieved that ISIS has managed to increase its roster to tens of thousands of members by
broadcasting its savage attacks over social media platforms such as Twitter, which helps
radicalize and ultimately recruit fighters from around the world.
Recent attacks on American and European soil demonstrate ISIS’ potential to reach,
organize, and mobilize lone wolves and sleeper terrorist cells among westerners. Many of
these actors are known to have consumed radical material online and many have claimed
to gravitate towards Islamic State because of it.
This paper posed two research questions: the former was concerned with proposing
good practices for data collection, validation, and analysis of online radicalization. The
latter aimed at revealing the network and temporal activity patterns of ISIS influence
on Twitter. To address these questions we analyzed the activity of a group of twenty-
five thousand users associated with ISIS. These accounts have been manually identified,
reported to Twitter for verification, and subsequently suspended due to their involvement
with radical propaganda. This process yielded a human-curated dataset containing over
three million tweets generated during a period of one and half year, 92% of which in
Arabic language.
Regarding the first research question (RQ1), we highlighted the challenges related
to studying Arabic content, due to the limits of existing NLP and sentiment analysis
toolkits. We therefore suggested the adoption of content-agnostic statistical and network
techniques to dissect the users’ temporal activities and connectivity patterns. By leverag-
ing a computational tool named dynamic activity-connectivity map, we highlighted the
dynamics of social influence within ISIS support.
For what concerns the second research question (RQ2), our findings suggest com-
plex strategies carried out by these users to manipulate and influence others: four dynam-
ical classes of ISIS supporters emerged (common sympathizers, information broadcast-
ers, influential and hidden influential users), each with distinct activity and connectivity
patterns. We concluded by quantifying the extent to which ISIS support and extremist
content are adopted in the general population: by drawing a parallel between propaganda
and epidemics spreading, we determined that each ISIS supporter “infected” on average
2.13 other users before Twitter suspended his/her account, highlighting that receiving
retweets and mentions follow different dynamics, and that broadcasters and influential
users generate much more widespread contagions.
Although we call for caution in the interpretation of these results, due to the great
simplifications introduced by our framework, we believe that our findings will help de-
sign and implement effective countermeasures and responses to ISIS social media oper-
ations and other forms of online extremist propaganda.
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